

Dr. Ellsberg: Lecture 5, January 17th, 1984, at Harvard.

Does it work or does it not work and why doesn't it work with it plugged in the microphone. I don't understand.

What's wrong with this quote, and let's not give just the same answer; that's obviously, that's a cheap shot as Nixon would say. This is Reagan's speech yesterday: "The harsh rhetoric from the Kremlin have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and increased danger of conflict. This is understandable but profoundly mistaken. America's deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a more safer place. Yes, we are safer now, which is not to say we're safe enough". What's wrong with this news story? Well, we all know he's the President of the United States. In other words, the man uttering this judgement; I'd say two things about him. There's strong and growing reason to believe that he believes that statement, that estimate which means that he's in a minority. Seventy to eighty percent of the American public, regularly now, which means Republican and Democrat, judge that the world is more dangerous and that Reagan has made it more dangerous and that policies he's making are more dangerous, and they're right. YaKnow, the majority is not wrong about this point. So he's in this minority who believes-and there is a minority who believes-the contrary, and by all signs he's about to be reelected. Isn't that true?

Q-We are going to prevent it.

Dr. Ellsberg: and when people say, well look at this opposition and so forth-and this is not the lecture this is the preamble but I actually-he's not here tonight is he? I actually raised this question having just read the speech with a Harvard psychiatrist who hadn't heard about this course. I want him to come, a guy named Flannery. Greg Flannery, he said he might come tonight. But

I was just asking him what as a psychiatrist, what; seriously, explain this to me, yaknow about the country that...Well, the answer is that economic matters account for more than this risk that they see somehow, which somehow needs, is worthy of note... But is it as simple as that? For instance, is it clear that we will be better economically than under one of his adversaries, one of his opponents. That doesn't seem self evident to me or to the public and so forth. The world is getting-it seems to me-very much more dangerous. Most people can see that and it is not overriding, their perception of him-according to people who sample these things-as the man they choose to make judgements of that sort for them. If anybody has any insights on that I'd be glad to hear it. Well, I would like to, I promised last time..so that some of you know, I just reviewed notes from last time...that we would go this time into the question of the routes of obedience, having talked a good deal about some of the effects or the phenomena, the existence of obedience. How many people have not been to earlier lectures, how many people are here for the first time? Oh, a fair number. Raise your hands high, will you, so I can see it. How many have just been to one lecture earlier on? Well, I don't want to spend a lot of time, and I don't think I need to, you'll see, going over the earlier stuff but I should at least spend some then, and earlier we've talked a good deal about the implication of the Milgram experiment you may recall...Had to do with the discovery that most people inducted rather casually into the psychological experiment are willing to give on the order of someone who holds no, no persistent authority over them, no-someone that they just met essentially but who is in the position of an experimenter and a representative of science. They are willing at the orders of this person to give electric shocks which they're led to believe, and do

are extremely painful and may be lethal, in the course of a psychological experiment to a subject they've never seen before. An experiment now that's been duplicated a great many times, even in different cultures with very similar results, showing that the phenomena of unquestioning obedience, almost without limit, is available behavior to most people and that there really was no line beyond which they would not go in obeying in this rather casual situation, which wiped out the notion that to get this kind of torturing behavior, to induct people into the position of being under some circumstances a torturer, even a killer. It was not necessary as supposed, to go through long indoctrination periods, as in the army, to be at war, to have a dehumanized opponent, various other things that have usually been invoked to explain the dangerous phenomena of wartime plans and obedience. Okay, we haven't...now, that isn't to say that people were not, showed no capacity for disobedience or that they would do this, that they would show this obedience under all conditions. On the contrary, the experiments vary the conditions a good deal and show that you could change them in such a way that lots of people or even most people would disobey fairly early on. But the point was that there were conditions which weren't at first sight, all that different from the others, in which people seemed incapable of disobedience and they behaved in a way which was described by observers as almost hypnotized even though they'd gone through no formal induction process other than coming in. Okay, the-and I related this to direct phenomena of my experience and less directly all of our experience, in our society, in which thousands of people, actively took part in a process for which all of us paid as taxpayers and to some degree accepted, which was the dropping of 7½ million tons of bombs on

Vietnam. Much of that, indeed most of it, in a historical period, when nearly all the participants, taxpayers, citizens, soldiers and planners had all lost any real confidence that they were in a valid project, that this served the national interest in continuing, yet the process itself did continue. Other historical processes, even the final solution in Germany; very specifically, the process of planning for nuclear war, including the possible first use of nuclear weapons by the United States; this is a planning process that has involved again, many thousands of Americans at various levels, ultimately millions, in the armed forces, but the very planning process with the degree of awareness of what was going on has involved thousands of people, and this has been planning for the, what I describe in the first lecture, as the deliberate destruction, under a wide variety of circumstances on the order of a President, of every city in Russia, and Eastern Europe and China at various times, with the expectation of retaliation by the Soviets. Since this/that was planning then for the deliberate destruction of half a billion to a billion people.

Since this course began, something else has been learned which I alluded to in the last lecture. Herman Kahn, twenty five years ago, actually in 1959, did the first presentation of the likely consequences of a thermonuclear war, the analysis of the effects of it on people that he had done at Rand, and he described that, the consequences as enormous, terrible, but limited and said, -I was just reviewing this-said in italics in his book: "With all of our study, and we've examined all the possible circumstances and conditions, as well as can be done at this stage, at least within the next decade or so, in the foreseeable technical horizon, there is no possibility of destroying most people on earth with nuclear weapons, no matter what the military circumstances, no matter how

the bomb were used"-and this was confirming what Edward Teller had been saying for thirty-five years-"that there is no way to kill everybody, that the possibility that Schell focused on, as a possibility in The Fate Of the Earth, was an impossibility" according to Teller, and I was noticing that Kahn was emphasizing that in italics. Kahn did present a hypothetical construct which he called the doomsday machine which would be a mechanism for destroying all life on earth, that would work either automatically when a few bombs went off in the United States or in other pre-determined circumstances or would, would be triggered by the President, but on the basis of understood rules, it might put the President into the problem and he got a lot of publicity for this notion, the doomsday machine because it sounded so dramatic in the name, but his purpose was not..namely that nobody wanted; first, that we did not have such a machine, and that anyone who described our present plans as having such an effect were wrong as the first point he wanted to make. Second, that although, therefore, he wanted to argue against those people in the Pentagon as well as outside it who mistakenly described our plans in those terms. Second, he wanted to make the point that although this might seem to fill the requirements of deterrence admirably, he conjectured that it would be relatively cheap, maybe ten billion dollars and very reliable and would be the ultimate deterrent if somebody attacked you everyone would die including the person who attacked. Nevertheless he said, he wanted to report the fact that nobody in the Pentagon or elsewhere, almost nobody, liked the idea. He said military men-he was very struck-rejected this notion. It will kill too many people, it was too automatic; he oddly missed a rather obvious point, is that it puts all of them out of work entirely, very simply, and he missed that, but he thought it would be reassuring that nobody

wanted to buy that and he thought that as a result, not only did we not have a doomsday machine but neither side would build a doomsday machine, he judged, he predicted and he even, to be comprehensive, addressed the question: "Might someone eventually, inadvertently build a doomsday machine?" and he said no...the process, this is in '59.

Q-Who built the script first, he or the Dr. Strangelove people.

A-The Dr. Strangelove is a direct quote from Herman Kahn. The concept comes from the, the Dr. Strangelove movie came out in 1964, you remember in Dr. Strangelove, when the Dobreynein character, the ambassador says "we have built the doomsday machine" and this was to be triggered by a few bombs dropped on Russia and the problem then was of the movie that Buck, no, Jack D. Ripper, a SAC general, had arranged for a few bombs to drop and this was going to trigger the doomsday machine as it did at the end of the movie and you see all the bombs going off, and Herman conjectured in a footnote that this probably would rely on either radiological effects or major climatic effects of some sort. But, in any case, he said no one would do it inadvertently either because it was hard enough to design that it would cost enough money that it would be subject to review and people just wouldn't buy it.

As I mentioned last time, and some of you may have picked up by now, Carl Sagan, Paul Ehrlich and others in the studies that have been now presented in Science magazine in which there's quite a good political discussion by Sagan in Foreign Affairs, in the current issue on the climatic effects of nuclear war, shows that if, shows that if you hit enough cities, that the soot from the burning cities, a factor which was I'm told, unaccountably left out of all previous calculations by-the soot from the burning cities absorbs so much more light from the sun, than the dust which was

earlier factored in and stays up so much longer and goes up so much higher than the dust which was earlier factored in, that unlike the dust, which will not result in catastrophic climatic effects from exposure, the soot may kill everyone. It may cut off sunlight long enough, it almost surely will cut off sunlight long enough to lower the temperature by thirty or forty degrees centigrade causing a phenomena known as nuclear winter, but it will have such climatic effects that the wind patterns will take both these clouds cutting off the sun and the radioactivity into the Southern hemisphere which was previously thought to be relatively exempt from these effects and interrupt the food chain among other things as well as subjecting most of the earth to a winter of, where ground water is frozen, everything else is destroyed and darkness, winter and radiology.

It so happens, as I've also mentioned earlier in the lecture, that the cities which are an essential link in this process as targets, have been targets both in our second strike plans and our first strike plans every year since we've had nuclear weapons and we have had enough weapons-Sagan figures-to trigger this catastrophic effect since 1953. By keeping the race going-the Russians did not have that, they acquired it, I think he says in '66-they had the ability to destroy all life on earth by triggering this climatic catastrophe. Of course, the effects are cumulative so if either side does half of it you have the same effect if they both do that of course.

In short, Herman was wrong, made a mistake, Teller made a mistake. He had a doomsday machine in '59 as he wrote because not only did we have enough weapons to do this but they were in fact targeted on cities as they still are and it will be very hard to get off the cities because an ideology has arisen for-going back

early into the second world war, and had its roots even earlier than that just after the first world war and strategic bombing doctrine which makes cities the sacred targets of very large organizations starting with the British and American Air Forces and undoubtedly now the strategic rocket forces of the Russians, and even where cities are not accepted formally as the targets, military targets in cities are regarded as again as sacred, as necessary targets that cannot be eschewed without essentially accepting defeat. The organizational factors here-I think-are such as to make it very hard to change those plans even after the discovery that hitting the cities is suicide. So, one question then which is the real, the non-psychological; well, it's yaknow, the question that in a way underlines the course has now gotten defined to be this: Now that the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union know or have the ability to know and most of their staff will know that what they are presiding over is a doomsday machine, that that is our current warplanning process/structure for general war, will they dismantle it? Herman conjectures that no one will build such a thing. It's true that as a doomsday machine it was built inadvertently, it was not the intent to _____ but in the next paragraph he goes on to say "If you had a doomsday machine, is it available only for-what he calls-type 1 deterrence?, that is deterrence of nuclear attack. He points out no, you can lay down a list of circumstances other than an attack on yourself which would lead to the setting off of this machine and thus use it to deter them from doing that. Yaknow, don't go into Afghanistan, don't go into NATO, don't do, don't restrict immigration. You could make the list rather long. You could also put a lot of triggers on it and make it a hair trigger machine and so forth. All of this is what we've done and although it's true that they did not perceive that —

what they were doing was making a doomsday machine, the question really is, will the people and organizations and nations who were willing to use as an instrument of policy the preparations and readiness and threat to annihilate a ½ a billion people at the obvious risk that they themselves would be destroyed, will they be led to an entirely different path of bureaucratic and national behavior by the discovery that it is not only the two nations that are at risk but it is also the Southern hemisphere. That doesn't seem to me very likely. I don't know that we'll have to discuss that a whole lot but I'll just say...I think that the problem we're facing is we do have a doomsday machine, it was made inadvertently and the discovery that it exists is not going to lead to the policies being changed by the people who made it, by the people who made it. That isn't to say that the discovery will not have political affects. For example, the Southern hemisphere has interests in this matter which are more direct than any of them could have realized three months ago and claims, and if there were world courts for _____ yaknow and for being exposed without any involvement of their own, any consent of their own to extreme possible injury, they would have very good claims on this for injunctions let's say; they do anyway, a lot of countries do anyway but let's say the Southern Hemisphere as a whole. Well, as I say, its all been true of neutrals and other countries for twenty years now and they haven't done much about it. The Southern hemisphere as you know is the poor on the whole, the poor and relatively powerless in part and we can also ask the question whether they will act more effectively to protect themselves than the American voters are acting who are quite consciously, immediately at risk and always have been. So, this is the kind of large scale phenomena that we want to come to understand. Now, I think that summarizes some of the main

aspects of...

Q-I'd like to add something. I read that Teller said in the beginning of December, "that it's a duty to survive a nuclear attack."

A-Yah, well, Teller said this in his civil defense piece in the New York Times and Teller started by the way, his op. ed. piece in the Times after the Sagan material had come out. I think he felt that he had to unload an op. ed. piece very quickly before the market dropped on this thing, on the need for civil defense and thus described, he started it by his usual glass half full approach as opposed to the doomsayers by pointing out, "in the worst possible nuclear attack, at least forty million Americans would survive even without civil defense." I started a lecture the other day with this as the good news. It didn't get any rise I see, I had to really cheer people up, I had to turn to my other piece of good news which was that it was Richard Nixon's birthday. Orange County, and it did rise. But the fact is he's wrong, he's wrong. He has no answer to this and they say that calculations made before looking at soot might have suggested such a possibility and they don't anymore so I now by the way realize I think why Teller-I was looking at my old notes for some of the earlier lectures and I've always conjectured first, I've always emphasized the Southern hemisphere _____ so as not to be alarmist and not to try to-to define the problem as precisely as I could and say we're talking about killing a billion people, we're not talking about, I'm not going to talk about the death of everyone. That's why I emphasized that and I've, but I've also often commented on the fact that I was puzzled as to why Teller though that distinction was as important to be seen, to be believed, that it would be only, because he himself would sometimes say a billion people, it's only a quarter of the worlds population that will die. Why did he regard this as

so reassuring? and my conjecture was that he thought that killing everybody was a moral issue and really forbidden and that that was all that was forbidden. Now that I see, now I-form the perspective of nuclear winter, where I now recognize that killing everybody is in our options, in fact is the likely result of what we're going to do but is a real option-I've rethought why this point is so important to Teller and Kahn and Lowell Wood. These are people who have in fact emphasized the need to threaten or carry out first use of nuclear weapons on the one hand I do think they want to be reassuring that if worst comes to worst not everybody dies, yaknow, in other words, the effects are limited at the worst, that's , that's part of it and that's, that's explicit, that's what he says he's doing. But I think it's more than that because that isn't very reassuring. I think the real reassurance he was conveying all this time was, the world is such that although half a billion to a billion people may die, if you go first, they die, we don't die especially if we have made appropriate preparations. You see something that well...

Q-Teller would never really believe that I think.

A-See, well it's not only Teller. Reagan very much believes this, the whole Reagan team believes this, but they haven't been willing; I'll tell you one last thing about their policies and tie it in with the earlier lectures, that , that is little understood. They are not willing for obvious political reasons and I'd say good reassuring political reasons to us to expose the American public their full degree of emphasis on first strike, that that's what they're talking about because they know that's at best controversial and maybe has the majority of people against them. Therefore, when they talk about programs they leave it ambiguous as to whether they're talking about first or second strike or they even imply that it's for second strike that it's for a retali-

atory context. These are programs that often look quite insane, just wildly psychotic, crazy in a second strike context and this ranges for a great variety of things. How can the MX counterforce capability be any good for retaliation when you consider on one hand that it will be destroyed in a Soviet first strike since it's in Minuteman silos and second, that if you use it second after a Soviet first strike against Soviet silos their missiles will have left so this seems; well, and then they really then come up to show how far they're willing to go with a cover story. They have an answer to that. They say, well, there's a reload capability, we're going after they have hit us then with some thousands of warheads, we will keep them from-this is really what's given. We will keep them, with the MX, by using the MX, from using their reload missiles. Well, that looks insane to any _____, yaknow, how much can that be worth, twenty billion dollars, 100 billion dollars, anything? There's also by the way a technical answer to that which is that the, the need for an extremely precise large warhead which lands within a hundred yards at a distance of 6000 miles is needed to destroy a missile that is safely buried in its underground silo. That's the hard job. The reload missiles, if they exist (which is a question) are accepted even by Reagan and others to be somewhere else, yaknow, stored above ground essentially somewhere and to be moved to the silo for a second load which is an absurd idea anyway and from any point of view but not beyond the possibility of a Russian bueracracy to imagine just as ours. You don't need an MX warhead to hit their reload missile even if there was a non-nuclear environment it would take many hours, if not days to get that reload missile into the silo and if nuclear war is happening, it's impossible in a dozen, for a dozen different reasons and ultimately by the way you would need

a precise weapon, you'd need a weapon that would yaknow, it was not nece-designed to kill something in a silo but something above ground, it can hit very far away, it doesn't have to be very accurate, it doesn't have to have as large a warhead-you follow that-so the argument which they give and which, by the way, I can say is believed sincerely by people, sincerely by people in the Pentagon and at Rand, this kind of argument because the exact counterpart of this for a long time-second strike damage limiting is what it's called, they call it second strike damage limiting and even Macnamara you see built up the MIRV and built up all these things not for first strike he would have said but for second strike damage limiting, that is insurance during the war and so forth and that's if you want to know how people explain these things to themselves, why they're doing these things, that's and I've even discussed this recently with somebody at Livermore, this is the reason they will give obviously. The smartest people in the country by IQ, that's how they get into this line of work and they're saying something that I think my son who's six years old could take apart which shows...

Q-We don't understand that.

A-No, now I'll go further and say, let me, not to spend too much time on this but say they do believe it and just say it's a phenomenon by the way of; well, ther's two aspects to it, I allude to this later but one is the Ellsber principle which I learned in the Pentagon which is, anyone can be as dumb as he has to be to keep his job, and in this case of course it's not just keeping a job but it is persuading yourself that what you're doing is not genocidal, is not suicidally reckless, is not yaknow, ultimately immoral and the _____ but has some justifiable purpose and the team you're on has a justifiable purpose even if you think—

this isn't a great idea, you can accept, crazy as this is, that the President does sincerely believe it and you'll go along with him on this one because he's good on some other problem and so forth. I mean the idea that the President believed this should be yaknow quite frightening but it isn't so if this is an aspect then of the obedience phenomena...

Q-_____?

A-Well, no here's what I was going to lead to say. I went into a rather long technical question. Let me mention answers, give other examples that will be a little more obvious. The, the FEMA, the emergency management agency talks about evacuation and Teller talks about evacuation, Herman Kahn talks about evacuation and everybody says yaknow, it seems on the whole quite absurd, look at Boston on Friday afternoon, New York, how could you evacuate on fifteen minutes warning and so forth and they don't come up with a good answer to that most of the time. You could talk about ABM which won't work and so forth. All of these things work up to a point yaknow reasonably well if you strike first. No really good first strike capability is available by any means and never will be for it hasn't been possible for twentyfive years but let's say when these things were first talked about twenty-five years ago when the Soviets had in fact four ICBM's and 194 bombers, then, a lot of these things would have worked quite well on first strike though even then they wouldn't have worked if the Soviets had gone suicidally first. In other words, if you are in a crisis situation where what you are trying to do is to threaten the Soviets that you might go first and this is what they have in mind, then evacuating would be part of the threat, it would have some dangers and everybody's noticed that the others might strike first if you did that but if you have enough deterrence to keep them

from moving too fast, and this is what Herman would say, and they see you evacuating the cities, that presses your threat capability, it now makes it harder, it was thought for them to kill everybody. That's what Teller would have said. I've actually discussed this point with Teller. As a matter of fact, as a matter of fact, I now thought, my one exchange with Teller dealt exactly with this point. He said in front of the California legislature, I mean, I had about an hour to go back and forth with him but this was what it focused on. He actually said that under appropriate civil defense, if the Russians used appropriate civil defense as they are planning but have never rehearsed; their plans include evacuation but they've never rehearsed it, but he didn't say that. He said, if they use their civil defense we could kill at most, 10% of the Soviet population and I asked him when I had comment and I said, Dr. Teller, if you were given the job, which I'm sure he has been unfortunately, if you were given the job by the Department of defense to beat that Russian civil defense program, would you reject that job as infeasible? Well, he was consistent enough to say, yaknow, you couldn't kill more than 10% of the American people with our current nuclear stockpile. Well, to be consistent in front of me he says, I would reject it because it is infeasible. Well, what Sagan has pointed out, when you hit the empty cities you kill everybody so you burn the cities, that was the mechanism that he hasn't noticed although when Sagan came out with this stuff Teller said, "we have known this for a long time" which is a very interesting comment. It might be true, Sagan reacted to it as if it were true and said, well, that's terrible if you've-on the television-if you knew this, then how come you didn't tell us and so forth. It might be that they've known about this in classified studies for some time but anyway,

the point I'm making is that a lot of these things do work better and to some extent they really work; that is true of anti-ballistic missiles, it's true of evacuation, it's true of counterforce like MX missiles, that they work if you go first, at least, if they work at all they work then and rather than admit that to the public, that that's what it's for and let it be tested on that ground- wouldn't look too good then either but you would have something to say for it-they prefer to look absolutely idiotic as if they're talking about second strike. Notice, they get the obedience they need, they have been denied nothing despite this quite insane appearance.

Okay, I forgot how we got on that but let's move onward. What I promise to get to-I'm sorry but you did have your hand up a minute ago, didn't you? Oh ya, I'll close this point. What I realize now that Teller was really saying with all this stuff that we don't kill everybody was "at worst" he says, "you lose a billion", but the hidden writing there was, at best, if we go first, which is what I'm talking about as a threat at least, we lose very few. He only said the U.S. would lose only some 10% of its population if they were forced to go first under these appropriate and that's what they've been saying all along, that the casualties will be on the other side. The reason the doomsday machine, which was understood to be a conceptual possibility as Herman said-any physicist could yaknow, given the job of killing everybody could probably think of a way to do it eventually. The reason that they were so concerned to say that that was not the way we were going and it was not what we had was that the doomsday machine tells you that if you go first you die and civil defense doesn't help and ABM doesn't help and so forth and counterforce doesn't help and that's what they had to refute all the time, that what we...that it was inevitable that we would die.

I think that's what he's really been talking about so it was a little less moral, a little more, a little more speaking to our own egotistical needs than I had realized.

Q-I'm struck by the interesting logic of the whole thing and I'm thinking of Plato in the Republic in small and large letters, the individual versus society, the state projection of the internal structure and division and to reverse it if we took two individuals having the equivalent of 500 tons of TNT which we have in terms of nuclear forces. Two _____ adjacent plus machine guns facing each other the way the two states are facing. Most people, most professionals and _____ say those people are crazy, they are paranoic. Now, basically, the whole thing seems to be if we limit it to two individuals gigantic rationalization of crazy thinking so all the arguments with all the very brilliant minds participating is like very, very intelligent paranoics who have very rational assistance but, and the lying _____. Now, the rationality means, something has recently come across; President Reagan had some correspondence _____ somebody in Israel in connection with apocalyptic times, tried to get some information about apocolypse and I wouldn't be suprised if Reagan believes that the goods will win and the center _____, that all of the good one's will survive, it may go as far as that.

A-No, right, okay you defined, that's another way of defining our problem in a way, that we have a President who was asking about armageddon and perhaps that's what was about the...and as I say, as I said at the beginning, and we're, we may be about to reelect him. If we don't reelect him, nevertheless, a large part of the country will have voted for him and that's what has to be explained and I've also gone one step further and said and the risks are just one notch more than we thought six months ago or a few months ago when this course started. It isn't just the

nothern hemisphere, we don't have a spare hemisphere it turns out, to experiment with. It is actually only one globe.

Q-You might be interested in hearing, this is just the sort of illustration and yet, but I'm seeing a fifteen year old boy who's been very disturbed and in his life, who's quite intelligent, has heard Carl Sagan's story about nuclear winter and his response was to say that all these facts, or came out somehow and he said, 'really what we bought to do is instead of shoot our warheads at Russia, we should shoot them at ourselves and that way we wouldn't have to wait around and die painfully and slowly; it was right after the movie was on, the Day After, he said it would be much better and we'd really prick 'em if we blew ourselves up and then they'd die slowly and then that's how they'd get the worst of it.

A-Any responses to this by the way the

Q-I had somebody say the same thing, a frenchman, this summer...

A-Really. There is an interesting answer, aspect to that, I alluded to it once before. I think that part of what people and you hear this in responses to the Day After. I think that part of the acceptance of nuclear war is the belief that we all go together and it's a sudden and it's in fact one of the best ways to die and people-you're not a survivor and you don't meet survivors, we all go together and it's instantaneous.

Q-That dialogue happens 5000 times a day in Cambridge, all go together.

A-And it's not like dying of cancer or of course the first thing thing their missing is that even without nuclear winter, for most people who die, it is dying of cancer, precisely and or something like cancer and that's true at every level of nuclear war, neutron bombs or anything else. Most people who die will die slowly and very painfully which people don't realize but of course the nuclear winter does say well, that, that goes all around the

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He's referring, you see the odd thing of the Sagan briefing, which, they all start this way. I saw a transcript of one. They start as the NAS, National Academy of Science last study shows the immediate effects will be about a billion point 1, 1.1 billion dead and another billion dying shortly, about two billion dying fairly shortly. Now we're going to talk about the survivors. That's an issue in his briefing is that the survivors died very painfully and slowly but not too slowly. So, that, that does reveal I think most...the thing I want to focus on here is revealed, the misconception of nuclear war that has made people tolerate it to a certain extent _____. But...

Q-I'd just want to talk to _____, putting out the question which I suspect is on most peoples minds as to why the Sagan data which is from-well, familiar to society, it's not like it hasn't been publicized or; why it makes so little immediate difference and what is there, is in the way-you mentioned obedience-but there's something more. An inability to assimilate this reality that you're talking about.

Dr. Ellsberg: I wonder how many; how many people are yet actually aware of it really, strictly speaking.

Q-Well, even among those who do know, they're not doing much about it, I mean they're not; they're troubled, I don't mean that people aren't troubled but they're not...

Dr. Ellsberg: Here would be a hypothesis, most of those who know it, I think, who have really picked it up by this time-this is a close guess-are people who've already been somewhat close to this problem, who've already been watching for this, this kind of information and those are people who already have an attitude towards the killing of a billion people; either they think it's acceptable in which case they'd also...remember, no body...to consciously and directly and explicitly want to kill a billion people, they don't want this war to occur and I know this is possible but there are some people who are accepting the threat of it and the preparation and the readiness of it and other people who are opposing that and the people who oppose killing a billion people are opposing pretty much the same way killing five billion people and the people who've accepted the risk of killing a billion people I think are pretty quickly accepting the risk of killing five billion people since the billion that would die at worst under the current or earlier plan was everybody they knew only and they don't know anybody in the Southern Hemisphere so that in itself hasn't changed and

and I don't think the large society will necessarily...

Q-when you use the word risk then you're implying that there's a factor that maybe it would happen... so there's one paper in Science on December 23rd or something like that.

Dr. Ellsberg: Yah, they, I certainly think the, yah I don't think any, that to the winner it might not happen.

Q-Yah, or that it really isn't so bad or...

A-Well, there's two aspects to it. Some people were telling me last night that the certainty or the likelihood of this is a bit overstated on the basis of the data in the Science thing; that they popularly and politically overstated or stated the certainty of...

Q-That's reassuring, that its been overstated.

A-Well, if you're reassured you're reassured and if one is. But I'm pressing more the point that the war doesn't have to happen, not what'll happen if the war occurs but the people who are supporting our policies on the whole seem to hope and even believe that the war will not occur if they follow their policy; that's what Reagan is telling himself and I'm saying by...that's not a self evident statement, have our risks gone up or down because...

(CHANGE OF TAPE SIDE)

Q-Deterrence is really a state of mind and what he said, the simple minded psychological argument on which he was basing his whole study was really in the way more terrifying than any of it. He was saying deterrence is a state of mind and that in fact, the reason that we have to deal this way with the Russians is that they're quite different from us, they can be scared by "strength, strength, strength", he was saying this yaknow, to a thousand people, that this is the difference. The historian was saying, well, 'not only is that a difference, agreeing with Carol firmly' from our yaknow Department of defense, he's saying not only are they more easy to scare, that's all they know is intimidation, that's what they do, that's what they understand, not only that but yaknow, the old argument about how they're ready to risk all of their population as we of course are not when in fact all the evidence is to the contrary. What I'm saying is that the arguments these gentlemen were giving were really not even in arms control terms, they were in the most primitive psychological terms that you can imagine and he said, Carol, out loud, the terms as you stated _____ has to do with our evaluations of the _____

Soviets, just that.

Dr. Ellsberg: But moreover, see it's not only not, not in arms control terms, it in/ for all the limitations of arms control analysis which are many and a lot of the practitioners of it are here at Harvard & _____. To the extent this...his proposition involves ignoring whatever can be said to have been an accomplishment of that analysis in the way of _____ or clarifying issues. It's not graduate school over grade school to say that in the world of nuclear weapons, you do not necessarily increase your security by frightening another country that has nuclear weapons.

Q-There argument is you do.

Dr. Ellsberg: Yeah, but I mean, that's, that's can easily be said to, can easily explain why whatever truth that had in the world prior to nuclear weapons, that it has lost a lot of that truth in the world of the peculiar properties of nuclear weapons.

Q-But most people don't see that.

A-...and I don't...maybe they haven't but I'm saying in other words you have to...but they, but, on the other hand most people see the cantrary to Reagan, that the world has gotten more dangerous and they're, and not; they're right about that. Now, let me now apologize to the people who have been here before up till now. I realize every time I come and find out who hasn't been here before, feel an obligation to go over some of the same stuff, and therefore those of you who may have been here, hear an awful lot that you've heard before, and its happening, happened again. So now, if I can start and this, although I have some rather, a number of propositions I want to put before you that I think are new in this discussion-let me really, more than encourage you if you want to raise yaknow, your own points or have class discussion or everything, do. Don't, don't feel this has to be just lecture. I feels it's pretty hot in here, what can we do? Okay, letme, as I say, I asked, actually the person I promised, I've forgotten his name isn't here this time.

Q-Siteland?

A-So what I promised to talk about newly this time; isn't here but he will be?

Two questions were to count. He was very anxious and others were as well to get to the question of what can we do about this; yaknow all these things, let's talk more pos-

itively or more politically, or whatever about what solutions might be and...but, accepted that that would be the focus next time. I wanted to talk this time on what we can say psychologically or in terms of social psychology or sociology as to how this phenomena of bueracratically organized extreme unquestioning obedience which seems to underlie the, the speed and scale with which we are approaching armageddon. What/where does this come from psychologically and socially and then it would seem appropriate next time and in other times to ask the question, what do we know about, what can reduce this degree of obedience? He reised, he raised the question last time...we should focus on the question of why are some people disobedient and I noticed going over my response to that, that in my personal reaction that I increasingly find that rather mysterious looking at it at an individual basis, having talked to this and that individual who was very disobedient; finding the roots of that in that persons history and psychology isn't I think easy at all, as easy as it may be to talk about obedience. But what is easier to talk about, and in the end more relevant is, how can we change social processes and structures to make it morelikely that people which question, will resist and will change this process. Let's talk about that next time in particular on some Thursday and today now say, what can be said'-and here's where I certainly do want input from everybody for each other-what can be said about where the obedience comes from in the first place, what are the roots of this obedience, why are people as accessable, why are people as capable of being obedient in this way as they seem to be. The-let me refer-I brought several books here that bear a bit on this; one of them is Freuds group psychology and the analysis of the ego which has a lot of useful suggestions in it and which draws attention to certain behavioral and perhaps structural similarities between behavior in crowds, between behavior in intensely hierar-chial organizations like he mentions the Jesuits or an army; the behavior of people being hypnotized, the relation between hypnotists and subject and in some range, the relation of people who are in love, romantically in love, and he draws, he starts actually by drawing on Gustav Labaums analysis of the crowd which he quotes at great length actually and the -reprovingly-the point that he; the, the, one of the, a number of the points that he raises in Gustav Labaums description of crowd behavior is that; one thing that I can put aside for the moment is that there, it's very emotional behavior but another, that the *has a personality, behaves in a somewhat coherent way like an*

individual, seems to have a mind, seems to have purposes. He's referring in particular to the revolutionary crowds of the French revolution and perhaps later, 1848, but, as an individual, the group shows characteristics that are somehow less mature than any of its component members; that people in the crowd, and the crowd as a whole, act illogically, follow illogical beliefs or incredible; will believe anything that the leader tells them, or on the basis of rumor or _____ and have very primitive aims. They are released from inhibitions, they seem to act without the constraints of a mature personality and of course are very prone to violence, capable of violence in a way that almost no individual in the crowd would act if he weren't in the crowd. Freud, in explaining the crowd phenomenon, focuses on the relation of the crowd to a leader although as we will realize, an immediate objection is that not every crowd has a clear leader but that is the, is the focus that Freud makes and the, to sum of where he, what he sees as the common element in all this behavior is the ability and the tendency of individuals under some circumstances to relive the, their relation-and he makes this almost entirely a male term-of a boy to his father, to his patriarchal father; a dual relationship of dependency, of surrender, trust, being protected, and in particular of the father he says; the object in this case, the leader of crowd, the commander of the army, the leader of the church or the loved person is put in the place of one's ego ideal; they take the position of the ego ideal, to be obedient to that person is to serve, is in effect to serve one's conscience. Built, or perhaps shame lies in disobeying that person or in going contrary to their wishes or their interests, but on the other hand, anything that you do do in obedience to that person, as if that person were your conscience. Now there's a, there's a conceptual problem in that particular analysis, he talks about ego-ideal, he doesn't talk about Super-ego. In other writings he makes distinctions between ego-ideal and a Super-ego and with, with-I won't go into it now-but with the distinctions in mind you can see in this analysis that he is sort of confounding the two points, sometimes he's talking as if the person is an ego ideal and other times as if he's literally the monitoring, punishing conscience. But let's talk in rough terms at this point for the moment. Now that obviously corresponds to the, the phenomena in the, the Milgram experiment where, well, where another aspect of the crowds which Lebaum points in a short quote is that

the person, by virtue of anonymity in the crowd feels irresponsible, unaccountable, and therefore feels extra-and apparently that, that condition is enough to free the person to carry out very aggressive impulses that are ordinarily; he would not do. As Milgram points to and Kelman in his studies, Herb Kelman that we also talked about; this element of almost total feeling of irresponsibility in the bureaucratic framework or in the Milgram experiment is the key to this obedience, a feeling by the people in the experiment not merely because they are subordinate and because they have accepted the right of an authority to give commands to them, they don't just feel they are sharing responsibility which might seem reasonable, they feel that essentially they have no responsibility of their own, they have no choice, all responsibility resides in the leader and they are really free to carry out the commands without any further monitoring as if, as if they had no casual role, but causality is clearly not correspondent to a feeling of responsibility; it turns out to be two different feelings. Yes, I pushed the button but I had no choice. They analogize themselves, in one analogy to a transistor, to a switch that's pushed by somebody else, to a mechanical component. Obviously, in that sense, they dehumanize themselves so they become less than human in terms of a capacity for choice or independent action. They say, I had no choice. What is suggested here then is then a different analogy, that they are unconsciously analogizing themselves to a small infant who has no choice or no rightful choice at least as Freud conceptualizes the relation between a small boy and his father _____. The Kelman adds something by the way which is another question we wanted to keep looking at; Why do the leaders act as they act? Kelman suggests that the leader can, sees himself...

Q-Before you go up to the leaders, can we say something about this. I think there are a couple of things, I'm not sure they are very much emphasized in psychology ____ to the ego but it seems to me important to say that, to emphasize that there's more going on than a, a release from responsibility and I don't think it's really entirely fair or accurate to say that they become less than human when they do that. I mean, after all, Milgram's studies sort of emphasizes that it is part of the human condition that very many people will do this in a natural sort of way, and it seems to me that it comes out a little bit in the Milgram list at least that there's and it's very clear from most of our own experi-

ences in one crowd or another that there's in fact a kind of pleasure that goes along with the release from the constraints of our own Super-ego, that it's a delightful experience in some ways to give over the potential internal turmoil of the restriction and analysis and so forth of our own behavior and give that authority over to the leadership of the crowd, whatever it is, that in this way it is a regression, psychologically a kind of regression which is very pleasurable and is very natural.

Q-Nick, you're not talking about the pleasurability of releasing aggressive...meaning the devotional thing...

Dr. Ellsberg: Do you mind if I stand up a little here? First, I think you're saying two different things which are both very relevant as I ____ you. One is that, one other thing, is there really no other chairs out there to be found in peoples...

Q-There are no secrets here, let the world hear.

A-Okay, first, I thought you were actually ____ to talk of their...I think it is true to say that they feel free, ...let's say that, it's true. Another large part of the time certainly, people sense is not that of freedom as I might have described it...freedom from responsibility, freedom from guilt, though that may be there in the background, they are free but their subjective experience surely a lot of this time...let's take the people, well, people in the Milgram experiment who were-this is a good example-the people who were above all showing anxiety, sweating, protesting, very unhappy about what was going on but who kept on doing it. It would be silly to say that subjectively they felt free to do this and free of the consequences, free of responsibility; clearly, they would have said, and their subjective experience was: I have no choice which is words used to them by the way, by the experimenter. I have to do this, I don't want to do it, it's against my will and so forth, so their feeling is almost surely not one of freedom. We can say conceptually that they seem able to do, to be that obedient because they also show, they don't feel responsible but they don't feel it in terms of freedom, they feel it in terms of propulsion.

Q-And additionally they felt they were doing the right thing?

A-Yes, it's the right thing to do, right. The second thing is that in accepting this, or in many cases, in accepting the authority position, people will say...I mean, I'm

sorry, his/her authority _____, either I had no choice, I'm an American, this is my president, I didn't vote for him but nevertheless, and , or they will say, yaknow, the situation required this, somebody had to be in charge and it was necessary to, to do this so, in the first place, it's not always this subjective experience of freedom. Second though, you made a point that, that I think was important, in which you may recall was the last point I made about Keman. I think last time, which is that the word dehumanization is a definite questionable word. This phenomena is so widespread that to use the word dehumanization suggest an idealization and really a mystifying idealization of what it is to be human as we do when we describe behavior as, like bombing, as savage or bestial, when it is peculiarly the behavior of "civilized humans", it's not of beasts and it's not of primitives but we are deliberately mystifying ourselves and going along with that by saying, we humans don't do this, which is exactly what we do do and that when we do it, it's implied it's exceptional and we are lowering ourselves but; well, that could be meaningful but here we are talking about something that is so widespread, so common, that to suggest that it's exceptional is seeming likely to be mystifying, it's as if we were talking about war, as is often done, as exceptional somehow, when by any reasonable standard it's not exceptional, it goes on all the time.

Q-It doesn't need to be _____ exceptional but as conditions...not our nature, not our noblest moments.

A-But again, something that's as common as this, and let me define what this is, but I did raise a question, I think you were saying it, renewing it here in a good way, at the right moment. I used the word dehumanization but of course I was using it I think in quotes, to mean compared then to our usual sense of what it can mean to be human, but this is also what it can mean to be human. When _____ or Marlow, who liked to look at the bright side of things, yaknow, always talk about self-actualization and they talk about, well, we don't say that people are at their highest selves all the time but the point I'm making you say is that, this is what humans can be, they can do this, they have this potential; that's the human potential movement. Now why doesn't the human potential movement look at Hitler a little more than they do, or the Nazis and so forth, because that too is potential. Well, because those people are not self-actualized. Now, why is Reagan

going to be reelected if he is; somebody in the human potential movement in California...I'll now bring you words from California-who very much stepped in this mode, said something that I think at first sounds paradoxical, that which has, shows this movement at its best,... said, Reagan appeals because he is self-actualized, he appears to have joys in life. He enjoys himself, he is fulfilling his potential, he is fulfilling his potential, even beyond his potential.

Q-Yaknow, the self-actualization stuff, I think really leads from mind Dan to the heart of this matter which is that we have to ask, What in fact gives any human being a most coherent sense of identity, of self, of really, this is me, "I'm at my most alive" said William James, "when I am really myself". That's what it means to have a self and I think that what, when you talk self-actualization, yaknow, and the human potential stuff, they're talking about that wonderfully evolved group of people who don't look at these darker things and say this is really how it is and yaknow, the most happy side of it. But what Freud left out, and this is a little book I have carried around now for thirty years because it's a wonderful book, Freuds Psychology and Analysis of the Ego, but what he left out in my opinion, and he left it out of all his thought because he couldn't do everything was the relationship of the inner-world...

Dr. Ellsberg: Because he was human.

Q-right, exactly, with limitation.

Dr. Ellsberg: If I may say that in the presence of psychoanalysts?

Q-But, yaknow, in Janet Malcom's recent pieces, which I think have been in a way, really read for the gossip, fun and all the junk that's in them about Mason personally and _____

personally and so on, but I don't think she realizes that she ^{really} really puts at the heart of her pieces what is a terribly important question. Namely, what is the relationship of the inner world and the outer world and when she says there as Mason was pointing out that Freud missed a great bet in his thinking when he decided that the whole Oedipus thing was fantasy and not reality was that he then allowed all psychoanalysts after to forget about society, forget about social roles, forget about how important it is for a sense of self to really have some kind of a bridge between what's going on inside of you and what's going on in the society. Meaning, what social role are we fitting?

Dr. Ellsberg: Are we willing to say that Reagan is divorced from the reality of this society?

Q-No, not at all. Because his inner-being fits social roles that are so affirmed by this society. Reagan is probably one of the most coherent selves around.

Q-...in apparent freedom from...what do they...

Q-But that's a puzzle.

Dr. Ellsberg: But it appeals to people, he does see/look on the bright side, he is optimistic, he has various idiosyncrancies. He's confident, he knows what he's doing. I mean people actually, a psychiatrist said to me the other night, I mean just explaining, he thought the popular which he opposes but, that, how can they think that he's, how can they prefer him on even economic grounds to say Mondale and the answer is well, he has a theory, he knows what he wants to do and the others don't; now it's true the others don't have a very coherent picture but we do know, we have some notion of what Reagans coherent picture is, and the notion that we'd really prefer to follow that confident leader, where he's going, to somebody else who's less sure where to go is, I don't

fully understand...

Q-As his boss, at the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency has said about Reagan; he didn't call him the great communicator, he called him the great salesman, I mean I talked to this guy not long ago and he said he had the capacity to give the listener, whoever the listener was, the sense that what he was selling was going to make them feel so good about themselves, this is what I'm talking about, and he's still doing it, with awfully good PR written by various skillfull smart people so the sense that he is selling to us, to the American people, a self which can be proud, not embarrassed, the word embarassment is very important here, your notion about shame and what role that plays in this, tremendously important. That involves a social group in front of whom you can be embarassed, you can feel ashamed if you don't belong with them and Reagan makes everybody feel strong and they can belong and so forth.

Dr. Ellsberg: Well, here is, let me go right from that to this, which is being handed out here, incidentally, I'll give you som before we leave if you want, if this is too much to read, there is some abstract stuff in the middle here which is interesting but is dispensable. Mostly, does everybody has a copy of it. There are some pages that are more important than others but let me...The, one thought in here, an emphasis which I've thought for some time, glad to see it in here, there's a lot in here, Kessler. But he starts from a number of hypothesis as to why this obedient behavior, why this crowd behavior is available. Let me say this point right away, a proposition: I think what Kellman and Milgram are saying-first I'll say, Frued, LaBaum & others looked at this group behavior in exceptional terms, they looked at the crowd ripped up to a frenzy, specifically revolu-

tionary crowds where people behaved in unwanted ways and one way of summarizing what they described was that it behaves—they said—like an immature individual, it behaves in a infantal way. In fact, let me go beyond Frued and extend what he was saying in one respect: where he sees the root of that as being an identification, not an identification but a subservance, a surrender to a leader in the way that an Oedipal boy, a boy at an Oedipal stage surrenders to the model of the father at the point that his conscience is going formed, that the father is his conscience as he sees it. Let's extend that. I suggest hypothetically here, in the way that Melony Kline, but many other people, Dorothy ___ and others have and extended that analysis by focusing on the pre-Oedipal stage and not only as little boys but looking, looking at the relationship between not just a five year old and an adult but an infant who has let's say either not; who has just conscience enough to recognize difference between self and other but can't even move yet, is totally 100% dependent or let's say a infant that is somewhat beyond that, that can crawl around and is capable of recognizing how often it is frustrated by this mother. We're talking now almost about boys and grls but about their relation to, not the father but to the mother because the mother comes sooner in the experience of most infants in their consciousness and in their relationships. Authority and power then are represented by—it so happens—by a mother rather than a father but more importantly than that, it comes into awareness, the awareness of power doesn't come into awareness as Frued of ten suggests, it seems at the age of four, five or six but at a much earlier stage where the disparity is enormously greater and where the, on the other hand, where the consciousness itself is far less experienced, far less developed, it's different in a variety of ways,

so that the experience of power is different from what it could be five years later and the, of the experience of anything is different in an infants mind, an infants consciousness, on the one hand, not a childs consciousness, to make that distinction and second, the disparity in power is vastly greater. We, assuming, we're talking about now a stage that's beyond the sort of universal stage where you, where it's hard to distinguish whether the mother is not only holds all of your happiness, all of your satisfaction, all of your dryness, your fedness, your everything you need but can also deny it and does constantly just by not appearing when you want it, the nipple is not there at the moment you want it or it goes away too soon. The diaper is not changed or whatever immediately and as I say one aspect of the infants consciousness is that this experience, which is an experience of power, an experience of helplessness, of dependency, is at the same time a boundless kind of experience. You don't really have any basis for knowing if you're ever going to be fed again, if this pain in your gut will ever go away, if you'll die of it or not and it's not clear at all what death means either, it's an experience of chaos and pain, it could be endless by the way, the notion of its all being over in an instant, our notion of nuclear war is not available to _____, that's not the death their afraid of and if we even talked of an infant being afraid of death; it couldn't mean that exactly, what their afraid of is pain presumably, is torture, which by the way is what most adults are afraid of more than death it so happens. There are various aspects to this, I just allude to it for a minute, so let's say that the relationship that we're going to look at, that I'm going to talk about a little bit, is the core of some of these adult and group phenomena, is the relationship of an infant to a parent. Thus, the

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relationship of a moralist; well, literally, helpless, totally dependent being on a godlike figure who appears to have every capability of satisfying all your needs and at the same time to have a will of its own which clearly does not correspond entirely to satisfying all your needs constantly the minute you want it—a degree of opponent—there's obviously then two sides to that relationship. One, of lovingness; the, every baby who doesn't, except for the extreme examples who are taken no care of at all, has had the experience of altruistic, self transcending care by another person because a human cannot survive without that; we wouldn't be here ever if we're orphaned, even if we're war refugees, whatever horrible thing, if we're here, we've had some experience of nurture because we really can't make it on our own. On the other hand, on the other hand, we've also had the experience of extreme frustration by a figure that as far as we could tell; Milvin Klein points this out to what many people regard as yaknow, a melodramatic extent, an exaggerated degree, as she describes this, the bad mother or the bad breast, the one that isn't here when we don't want it, but it's plausible that to a considerable degree, as we can see by the nature of the crying and by the fear that comes out and the rage, that there's also this experience, a very early experience, of malevolence, even if it's only temporary or partial, and we have the problem as we grow up of integrating those, of gradually discovering that such,...first that the person isn't quite as nurturing or quite as malevolent as they first appear and second, that these characteristics are both coming from the same person and it's not that one person is all bad and another is all good. This is, we have to relate to both possibilities in given individuals and so forth _____, aspects of growing up. Another point is of course that this isn't only the relation of the infant to the mother, there are obviously are, obviously Freud was not totally off the wall when he talked about relations to fathers, later, especially in patriarchal families where the father was present and assertive and active authority and so forth, but another way of seeing that, if, to integrating that with this new emphasis

on the earlier period of life is to see that the relationship with the father, both at five, when he comes into the picture more or less at five or six or four or whenever, to some extent re-evokes and replays some of this early infantal feeling and relationships; you go through it again to some extent with the father going a different way, just as you do again at adolescence and again when you have a job and a boss and as Erikson and others point out, it never quite stops, you keep learning and as you keep learning you keep reevoking to some extent some of these earlier...

As Kessler points out as some others have pointed out, on the one hand when we look at the bueracratc homicide or some of the behavior we're particularly trying to look at; we're looking at peculiarly human behavior, intra-species homicide...is massacre, the sort of thing I'm talking about is peculiarly human. One would do well hiristically to look for aspects of human experience that are peculiar to humans as part of the explanations far that. One of the aspects being, he mentiones several such as, for example the brain, he looks at brain structures possibly perfected, integrated, in perfect integration between the relatively recent neo-cortex and the older brain structures in which have more to do with emotion. I'm not emphasizing that in this, I really can't evaluate it too well. Kessler, you'll notice, emphasizes the possibility that the neo-cortex develops so quickly and pulls on these lower more reflexing emotional structures that have to do with instinct. He implies that the problem is that the neo-cortex doesn't control the "old brain", the new brain doesn't control the old brain adequately, the reptilian brain. That raises questions in _____ mind because the problems don't clearly arise in the reptillian brain or the old brain. They did not have the phenomena that we're looking at and maybe it's this controlling part of the brain and it's perhaps seperation from emotions, its ability to act relatively "inhumanely" or emotionally abstractly, that's part of the problem but let me put that aside, that's not relevant. Another aspect is that the humans have a uniquely long period of dependency. In the experience that I just talked about, in its length and its intensity is an almost, is perhaps uniquely human. It's of

_____ relative to other species but among all males and mammals rather and vertebras, it's only humans who have this long period of helplessness and dependence and so a quick leap toward element, of a crude, element of a model, a theory as to what's going on would be that humans in adults in groups are capable of reliving and accepting, reaccepting a role, a relationship, an experience, that they have all in fact experienced at one point in their life, namely the, and I don't want to emphasize either; either that one year, one two year olds relationship to the one powerful mother or for that matter the five year olds relationship to a relatively powerful father in both aspects. The behavior of the individual then, in the crowd, let us say, can be seen as a form of regression to an infantal mode prior to a time when the or re-experiencing time prior to a time when the individual had a clearly developed internalized conscience to control himself but in fact took his cues as to what to do, or her cue, right or wrong, from an external person and that starting from the Milgram phenomena we can say, we can say, we see that humans seem able to switch their conscience off, it, that would be one way of describing what he's doing, or to delegate it to someone else to put it in other terms but to switch their own individual question and conscience off to a remarkable degree, not merely to muffle, not merely to have it as one voice among others but really to act as if it weren't there, that's the suprising aspect of it. They can switch it off. Another way then to say that; what I'm suggesting now is they can act like a child, they can choose to act like a child, by the way decieving themselves...

Q-Dan, would you accept the ____ that they not only can switch their consciousness off or delegate it under certain circumstances, but under certain circumstances they feel compelled to do that.

Dr. Ellsberg: Yes, and by the way, that's what the...but these are just two different aspects of the same thing, they can do and they feel compelled. If this were demanded of them but they couldn't do it, that would be a problem. For example...

Q-It's the compulsion though, to say I was only obeying orders.

Dr. Ellsberg: ..some cultures, see, humans are not all alike on that and cultures are not all the same on this...but I don't want to get drawn into this but I'll mention it. Some cultures can't be enslaved. This is why the Indians in Carribbean all die essentially and were replaced by black slaves from Africa. Indian primitive cultures were simply not capable of living under these conditions, they wouldn't reproduce for one thing. They did not mate. They wouldn't breed, they wouldn't mate, they wouldn't reproduce and they died out and they wouldn't obey and they were punished and this and that and they essentially, in the Dominican Republic where Columbus first landed, the effects of Columbus discovery was that all the inhabitants died, that is 99% died and they were, they just all gone and as we know general indians in this country were simply not enslaved, one could go into why that is but there is a difference in culture and there have been studies...Others simply can't fit in to industrial societies with its degree _____. So, to enlarge that, we can say the groups in acting in many ways, that the crowd is acting infantly, and now add one thing that I think is worth Milgram's adding to what Frued is talking about or LaBaum. He's saying that a highly organized, rational, sober, purposive, highly respected, counterrevolutionary group like an imperial bueracracy can exhibit almost all of the characteristics that LeBaum and Frued exhibit/observe in the crowd. They act like a crowd. They act as immature, as crazy, as illogical.

What's different? Well, the difference is that you don't have in many cases a direct face to face ____, in fact what's above all different is the first thing that struck LaBaum is the excitement of the crowd; of course you can have under some circumstances, and when we say crowd, we could say football stadium and so forth and like that. You don't have the immediate emotional excitement, it doesn't look as crazy. These people at RAND or wherever or Harvard faculty club turning out Living With Nuclear Weapons as the great product of this university, look obsessive or quiet, not exciting, hard workers, serious.

Q-Or respondents sitting in their living room responding to a New York

Times poll.

Dr. Ellsberg: ...looking at your aspect; also citizens. They aren't necessarily seeing each other, it's not immediate contagion, and it's not this excitement but in many of the other respects, without the excitement and without the contagion, they are acting as irresponsibly as they are crazily accepting wierd models of reality; predictions, judgements, who's our enemy today versus yesterday? Switching from one to the other, whole frameworks as if they were in a French revolutionary crowd. Suprise, counter-revolutionaries can behave the same way and there a lot more of them and they're better financed. They run the state, they may have armies under them so in some ways they are more dangerous. It is not revolutionary crowds that are going to blow up the world in a war. So that's one connection right there, that the suggestion then that what is observed for the madness of love, the madness of the crowd, the madness of, or even when Freud of course spoke of the Catholic Church or the army, probably was thinking as ____, as of crowds for that matter, with his general attitude to religion and phalices and so forth, his thinking of them as crazy. He's explaining this craziness like the induced craziness of the person being hypnotized, as you say they can feel compelled. Freud goes in to the point of how the hypnotist. He said, in a very nice point here actually. He says, "when a hypnotist says sleep, he is, as Ference pointed out, taking the role of the parent who tells you when to go to sleeps and he's focusing all attention on himself, it's on facusing of attention". I said that humans could switch off their conscience in organizations, that's a way of being human. One can also say to an extraordinary degree, they can focus their attention, they can accept direction as to what to pay attention to, what matters, what are the criteria. In all these respects as Milgram pointed out, in organizational behavior, they act like hypnotized subjects who say the world doesn't exist except what you hear from me, I say what is reality. I

tell you what you do next, I tell you what you want, I tell you what you feel. That, by the way, as Frued points out, that's a parental relationship. The mother says, "no, you're not really angry". "No you're not" the mother tells you what you feel and so does the hypnotist and so does the leader who says, "now you feel safer, now you feel angry, yaknow, we are outraged, this is outrageous conduct and so forth, so in parental relationships it is more archaic I would say, it is more--and when Carter tells us now we feel Malayse, who wants to hear that, get rid of that guy, it's not what they wanted to hear so we're reproducing a parental relationship and it's a relationship that goes earlier than the father I would say on the whole. That has to do with the fact that Mother then, being the experience of this awesome, wierd, uncanny power, being the power at a time when that's all the baby knows and then the relationship is, the disparity is so great. That means that mother is, woman in other words, women is experienced as a symbol for otherness, external reality which its compulsions and its unpredictability and its dangers as well as its attractiveness creating gender problems from the beginning, that I think by the way may be very important part of the military phenomena we're looking at, the phenomena of war. Now, that raises the question: Why is there a difference in/between little boys and little as they grow up then since they're all subject to this uncanny mother.

Q-There is something that strikes me having, what is the power that the kid does does percieve at that level, is it uncertainty? I mean, what motivates the child besides biological...there is a point when a one year old, two year old already know that he's gonna get fed and yet there still is something that motivates him to listen and obey and it's that uncertainty that I...

Dr. Ellsberg: Well, theres always as Melony Kline pointed out and Winnecut and others, the baby doesn't get fed and probably by the way wouldn't be good, what experience there is suggests theirs, it would be questionable if the baby did get, had an absolute absence of frustration and it felt, was allowed to feel omnipotent forever, that to think, desire, is to have it fufilled right away, but in any case there's not too muchdanger of that, it can only relatively approach that. The baby on the whole, almost any will have the experience of some period of pain in their gut that is not immediately, instantly satisfied and an awareness that the mother has an ability to go in the other room when you want her to be

here, in fact you want to be here all the time pretty much and she isn't here all the time and she has the independent will to go somewhere else, not to give you the breast or the bottle or whenever you want it, at the rate you want it; the nipple does not let it out exactly at the optimal flow all the time, impossible and by the way, we haven't even put the sibling question into this but that comes in for a lot of children as well, question of revalrous behavior at that level but the....does that answer your question? In other words, any child is bound to feel not just merely frustration but as they get beyond the nine or eleven month period, they're going to realize eventually that this isn't just like we might say, the weather or the nature of reality but that there is an independent will there by a mother who can provide but can and does withhold or delay or take away prematurely, so this experience of extreme power.

Q-I've been puzzled with you analysis as to whether you're making an analogy or whether you're making an interpretation of reality. It seems to me psychologizing this whole situation is putting it into a very limited framework, I'm just wondering if you're going to go on to try to talk about the sociology of it. What you're doing is very interesting but I'm wondering about the whole socialization process above and beyond the kind of small scale relations you're talking about, I'm also wondering a bout whether the crowd is the appropriate sort of model for addressing the issue of what's going on in the society.

Dr. Ellsberg: Well, first I would say taking backwards, you weren't here before I think, were you? Before it was not only sociology, it was political science, it was description of the bueracracy and so forth, so this is the time I promised to get into the psychology a bit more but, or at least raise the question. However, to make those links rather quickly. First, I don't think what I'm saying, let me say what I just said again in a little different way. I don't think the crowd is the model for what we're talking about. I'm saying that the phenomena that LeBaum and the irrationalities, the dangerousness the immaturity, the emotional liability, suceptability, the suggestability, and the proneness to violence, which they saw in the crowd and some of these other situations are in fact to be seen in the same intensity and significance in behavior which on the surface is not openly emotional and exciting and is not crowd behavior, it can be individual in an office or in a voting booth or wha tever, but is, in fact, is characteristic, I say in the same degree, clearly

they were contrasting the wild crazy crowds with the authorities and that's why you needed authority and what I'm saying is what we're experiencing in the 1980's is the discovery that the authorities are just as crazy in the same ways in their behavior but not, and this is what I'm suggesting earlier, not because they are crazy individuals but because of their relation is a social group which happens not to be a crowd but happens to be a nation, a hierarchical organization of some sort, a nation, could be an army, a society, but, in particular, a bureaucracy with tightly structured, it's even more obvious in clearly structured bureaucracies. So I'm saying then that what they were suggesting for the crowd also applies to virtually any organized social group and one's were particularly interested and most dangerous are the highly armed nation-states with their subgroups of the national security bureaucracy which the army, the police, the intelligence aspects, I wanna focus on those two groups, the nation as a whole and the subset of the nation which is the national security apparatus. I'm saying that then the, that too can behave in ways as destructive and self-destructive and third, unrealistic, crazy in its beliefs in relation to reality, crazy in its predictions, crazy in certain values, relative to the perceptions of people not embedded in that group. So its group, where as I think, if I'm not mistaken, group psychology as a discipline has tended to focus on relatively unorganized groups, client groups, therapy groups, and counter-groups or crowds, unorganized and if I'm not wrong has not spent a lot of time on corporations except from the point of view of the boss, of how to get more work out of this team but not of how corporations behave in their full craziness or their full, let us say...but I'm suggesting that if they were to do so, they would discover to their individual dismay perhaps, that a lot of this behavior which is, in relation to the individual, it's behavior that emerges when these people are organized together, when they get together, and is, can be wildly destructive and wildly self-destructive as well as unrealistic.

Q-_____ the first mortal, the crowd, and the hypnotic is your model for the electric, who may be swayed by the face of the television screen and the crowd; the second mortal...is the _____ of bureaucracies _____; the second is your Pentagon and all the bureaucracies and organizations.

Dr. Ellsberg: They overlap and they're distinguishable, they're different and I think

that's a nice point but that leads me, that allows me then to make a further proposition which is what I'm saying, that really those aren't, those two types of groups are again, have many commonalities in their phenomenon, they're not as different as...again, the bureaucracy will exhibit the same degree of hypnotic suggestability as this mass person...it will be more rational, it will have specific characteristics which are misleading, which may lead one to think, here we have, if a bureaucracy, one would like to think, if the bureaucracy is an individual, the organization, the corporation, the CIA, the Pentagon or the Army, if they're like an individual and they are in some respects, surely they are the adult, mature, the rational, yknow, the reasonable, the realistic, the empirical, the scientific individual, relatively speaking, relatively speaking, obsession, compared to this historical wild crowd out there and what I'm saying is that what we're discovering in the second half of the twentieth century is, they are as capable of going over the fucking cliff blindly as your wild, crazy bunch of hippies that are out there protesting this or that. That the difference between the Yipees at the Pentagon and the people in the Pentagon may not favor the people inside by any means. To be sure, when the Yipees said by pissing on the Pentagon they hoped to levitate it, they were actually kidding but if they'd believed that, it would have seemed unrealistic, but more unrealistic than beliefs in the top secret safes on the other side of the wall, NO! So what I'm saying in other words, definitely, as the Pentagon Papers showed I hoped, if one reads them, the stuff, the incantations in there, the predictions, the judgements are in no way superior to those of a member of Haree Krishna or any sect you might care to name as a matter of fact that you don't think well of. That's, that's what is being said here and that, that is an explanation that it's not because we have peculiarly...Now, something I haven't put into the model and we talked a lot last, is what about the behavior of the leaders, let's put in this psychological framework. As Milgram said speaking more sociologically, the leader turns out, he conjectured but very plausibly that the leader feels like and acts in many ways like the follower; this is what Milgram did not say. Milgram implied that the problem with obedience was that you might find yourself obedient to a "evil person", that is, a different sort of person would lead you astray. Kellman then suggests, 'no, the leader is not necessarily different from you or me anymore than the followers are'. He too acts in a way that appears consciousnessless

from the point of view as what we like to think of as normal human conscience, capable of being indifferent to the consequences of large parts of his actions, he too feels the first servant of the state, servant of a cause, responsible to an explicit and limited, delimited set of goals and criteria. He too is capable of forgetting most of what he would be able to perceive if he were an individual, his people are forgetting it while he's in office as if he were hypnotized, as if he were a follower, as if he were in love with the organization, and it alone determined what was good even though part of his job is to interpret what's good for the organization, but he still feels that he's doing that within constraints, that he's not free to do this, not free to do that. He manages thereby, since he has no choice, not to feel responsible and therefore not guilty and to do what needs to be done but all of it, yes, but I wanted to take that one step further in a minute; you had a question.

Q-I've been impressed with that point since we've started the seminar... talked about it a few times, but I'm just wondering about the psychological impact of how, and having people dependent upon, just something that people who are dependent don't have, I mean they are subservient but let's take someone like Reagan, he has so many people at his beck and call, and he has an awful lot of power at the same time so I can see the loyalty that he says, "I'm just loyal to this organization, to the ideals of this government", but there's something else that must have an impact on him psychologically.

Dr. Ellsberg: Well, I was gonna say, supposing this would be a hypothesis then but it's part of the structure here, that the...Put it in two stages; first, a president specifically; well, this is true of many people at different levels of hierarchy, you don't have to be president of the U.S. or the captain of a ship. The President of a fairly good sized firm, particularly true of the captain of a ship or the President; these are two apexes that I've been close to-has, from ordinary human point of view extraordinary _____ and prestige in the sense of being able to accomplish his personal desires, his sense of what should be done, having it done. I'm talking now, say the captain of a ship who has not —

civilian authority from fire people but he has this uncanny and immediate military law...put people on bread and water and in an instant he can ruin their careers and...so can the President of a corporation to some extent but they, but on a ship they have no where to go; in the short run and even in the longer run their careers are much more dependent on that person. He is treated as a God, to another extraordinary degree, that's of course even more true of the president so on the one hand quite, if you just look at the circumstances of their lives, the degree to which they are served by people who are efficient as well as motivated in anticipating and giving them their every need, "I want to talk to somebody", pick up the phone and you're on the phone to whoever that person is anywhere in the world right away, an uncanny capability, on the moon,, right, I want to talk to the moon. Well, think what that must have been, to do that. The, so they have their little frustrations no doubt from time to time, but in many circumstances, and they have people around them who are totally, who are describes as _____, who are totally dependent, have no constituency, are totally dependent for their prestige, their self-esteem, their career on this person's whim and they can be cut off, they're not subject to civil service, they can be kicked out of the White House in a moments notice and will be cut out if they do not serve that persons need. We don't have to go very deeply into psychology to think that this is going to have certain effects on the mind of that person, but let's give a slightly more concrete word to that. Well, I said I was going to do them, in two stages: One thing that occurred to me today, thinking about it was, that a person is able to act out the infants fantasy of the parent; mother doesn't feel that powerful, I mean the baby can't do much for her as a matter fact so her power over the baby is not translated into the kind of gratification that a president can get or a ships captain can get. They get appreciation. The feeling of power, they can get that to a certain extent, but on the whole, mother, in my experience, don't go around feeling tremendously powerful. Well, let me take that back. I'm thinking yaknow, it's I'm making, I now have a six year old. The experience of having a six year old as I point out is

nothing like the experience of having a babe in arms and if the babes in arms is colicky, which thank god mine weren't particularly, that can be a kind of torture. But in terms of the experience of power that you have, you are able to make this person totally happy and most of the time you do. That is a gratification which many mothers then, they have a very different feeling-or fathers-by the time you've got a five or six year old which is a very different experience. That's another reason why I'm putting aside for its emphasis on the relationship to five to forty or fifty as the model of the authority, the genesis of the authority situation; I think no, it's really earlier than that, it's somewhat recaptured in that. So I'm saying then that you're, they are reliving the relation of a parent to an infant that the President is when he looks at the public or he looks at the people immediately around him, not at the Congress...he's always getting in trouble but, that more of an older child, recalcitrant but delinquent, dope smoking, ungrateful, when they think of their voters and so forth, but especially the people around them they do relive then I'd say-I wanna come back to this-not only the actual relation of the parent which of course leads to parentalistic, non-democratic attitudes needless to say, kinglike attitudes, father of the country but I'm going to suggest it's also, it's a reliving, it's a kind of reexperiencing of an infantile experience. It's a reliving of the infants fantasy of a parent, I think that's part of it. I just want to say, I don't want to dwell on that too much because, let me soon. The other, the second experience that it's reliving is...

Q-I don't understand, the infants fantasy of being omnipotent as a infant or...

Dr. Ellsberg: No, the empathetic, the vicarious feeling, he's reliving an infants fantasy, he's being the fantasy.

Q-You're saying that the country or the group or the bureaucracy becomes the mother of the leader in a sense by serving him so perfectly.

Dr. Ellsberg: No, I guess I haven't made it clear and maybe what I'm saying is not clear. Maybe I am saying something that is not clearly thought out but

it...I think I can say this clearly: the role that the parent is filling is not a role; I'm sorry, the role that the President is living is not realistically a role that many other people in the society including his own parents, _____ so far, his own parents were not actually as powerful ever towards other people including himself as he is but there maybe a certain familiarity to that role. He is being what he thought his parent was. That's the, that's part of...Thus, you might think that his sense of entitlement is what he thought his sense of power is, what he thought his parent was able to do and had a right to do and was; he's God. That's related.

Q-_____?

Dr. Ellsberg. I think you're ahead of me because the next thing I was gonna say was, I said two stages and the other one it says, if you look at the Presidents quite, almost literally and consciously god-like powers of destruction and in general obedience, even with all its frustrations and so forth, the degree of power that he can deploy. The other thing that it evokes is a sense of omnipotence; it is, it's earlier than nine months, its; what I want to suggest is that the president is conditioned to be infantile just as his subordinates are but not in all the same ways and that it in infantal omnipotence that is evoked in the power and I've said it in two ways which may be distinguishable or may be not but now I'm saying that the President has an ability to feel I, that what, according to Melony Kline and other interpreters of infantile consciousness, guess, I can only guess is that there is a stage when the infant cannot distinguish between himself and the environment but still a feeling that you control that environment if the mother is sufficiently nurturing. I want it, it happens. I want to be fed, I'm fed. I want to be, it's magical, I have this power...